LTG Hughes at 50th Annv of CIA

In American Military You Can Grow – PVT to LT General Hughes

The journey of Private P.M.Hughes, Medic to Director of Defense Intelligence Agency and Lt General.

Army Intelligence Soldiers post Iraqi positions on one of the large-scale maps used during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. (US Army photo)

Buildup for Operation DESERT STORM

On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi Republican Guard invaded the neighboring country of Kuwait. Within 48 hours, the military force had established a defensive line along the Saudi Arabian border. The United Nations (UN) issued a warning to Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, to remove his troops from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, or face a full attack by a multi-national force. Tension in the region remained high as Saudi Arabia anticipated an Iraqi offensive on its oil fields and ports in the Persian Gulf.

Within days of the invasion of Kuwait, President George H. Bush announced the commitment of American forces to the region to counter any Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia. Operation DESERT SHIELD, a six-month buildup of troops and equipment in Saudi Arabia, represented an unprecedented projection of the US Army—the largest force assembled so quickly over so great a distance. Eventually, more than 500,000 troops from all services would serve in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Because the immediate need in the region was a combat force to counter potential Iraqi movements, the deployment of support forces, including intelligence, was a secondary priority. While combat units first arrived in late August, the majority of intelligence assets did not deploy until September. By the end of the year, however, the US Army had fielded the MI battalions of seven Army divisions, two Corps’ MI brigades, and a third MI brigade in support of the Field Army.

To mask US intentions, once in the region, intelligence assets were kept far behind the front lines, hindering their ability to develop a comprehensive picture of Iraqi intentions and capabilities. According to Col. Richard Quirk, the 24th Infantry Division’s G2, “we were primarily consumers of national and theater level intelligence, and were unable to execute the tactical intelligence cycle. …Higher headquarters prohibited us from moving the division’s intelligence collectors to the Kuwaiti border area in order to collect. We had received very little of the technical data needed by some collection disciplines, and we were unable to collect the information ourselves because we were too far from the border.” Furthermore, the G2 staff was unable to rehearse the collection management mission or test and develop its communications and reporting system. “The division intelligence structure was idling in neutral and losing a critical opportunity to prepare itself.”

In addition to being kept from the front lines, intelligence faced several other challenges trying to assist with both defensive and offensive planning. Not only was the region poorly mapped but the maps that did exist were in short supply, contributing to a lack of terrain intelligence. The lack of maps was compounded by the lack of imagery.

Reconnaissance aircraft could not fly over the Area of Operations until the airspace was secure from Iraqi air defenses. The Army’s only aerial intelligence capability, III Corps’ 15th MI Battalion, arrived in mid-October. Unfortunately, the Joint Imagery Processing Center, the only facility available for producing annotated hard copy photographs, did not arrive until December.

Consequently, the Army’s Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, a core component of the DoD-level Joint Intelligence Center in Washington, DC, used overhead systems to prepare 1:50,000 scale maps of the region overlaid with the locations of enemy firing positions. To the best of their ability, the deployed G2 sections also assembled terrain overlays, distributed on acetate or mylar, that showed lines of communication and transportation, gas and oil pipelines, water sources, and obstacles constructed in Kuwait by Iraqi forces.

During this preparation period, Division G2 analysts kept busy providing answers to questions about enemy mines, radar and air defense artillery. Counterintelligence assets integrated their efforts with Military Police and established contacts with locals to keep abreast of suspicious activities and locate Iraqi agents. The 24th Infantry G2 also built and shaped the capability of the Long Range Surveillance Detachment for eventual employment in combat. Intelligence personnel monitored media broadcasts from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to develop an appreciation of the political context of the conflict.

Terrain analysts published “TripTiks” with road conditions and checkpoint coordinates to aid truck drivers traveling on desert routes. Finally, higher-level intelligence sections distributed intelligence to subordinate S2s at brigades and battalions. On January 17, 1991, after Iraq’s failure to meet the UN deadline, a coalition force from 34 nations, led by the United States, moved in to force Iraq to retreat. Operation DESERT STORM started with a month-long air war, followed by a ground offensive that lasted only 100 hours. The intelligence effort over the previous six months, while fraught with challenges, had accomplished much to prepare the US for combat.

[This article was written by Lori S. Tagg, USAICoE Command Historian, in December 2015 for the Moments in MI series.]

History Project

If you are a veteran, contractor, or civilian worker with involvement in US National Security-we need you! The Lint Center for National Security Studies is committed to the preservation of histories of people involved in the shaping and development of US. National Security history as we know it today. The experiences of veterans, contractors, and civil service members involved in US N.S. are needed to not only to help us better understand our own history but to carry that knowledge forward for future generations.

If you would like to add your experiences to the archive, please Submit Your Story!

*If you are interested in conducting an Oral History interview, or have any questions about the program, please contact our historian at LC-VANS-Hist1@lintcenter.org.

513th MI Bde

513th Military Intelligence Brigade in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Vigilant Knights in the Desert

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. Four days later, the Army alerted the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade for eventual deployment as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD. By the end of the month, its first elements arrived in Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the brigade’s deployed strength ballooned to over 2,200 Soldiers. With these Soldiers, the 513th MI provided multi-disciplined collection, all-source analysis, and widespread dissemination of theater-level intelligence to LTG John Yeosock’s US Army Central Command (ARCENT).

Deploying from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the 513th MI Brigade consisted of four battalions that operated at the echelon above corps level. The 201st MI Battalion conducted signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations. The 202d MI Battalion provided counterintelligence (CI), interrogation, and document exploitation support. The 297th MI Battalion supplied imagery analysis as well as ARCENT’s Intelligence Center. Finally, the Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB) performed technical intelligence operations. In addition to these four subordinate battalions, the 513th later assumed command responsibilities for elements from six other MI battalions.

To follow its initial deployment, the brigade sent Task Force 174, under LTC Robert Butto, to Saudi Arabia. With elements from each of the 513th MI’s four battalions, the task force laid the ground work for the rest of the brigade’s arrival. Butto’s advanced party landed in Riyadh on 1 September. Within 24 hours of its arrival, it had established an Intelligence Center for ARCENT’s G-2 and begun to provide essential intelligence support. One of the center’s earliest studies provided an analysis of the terrain to the west of the Iraqi forces which stated that the ground could support movement by the Army’s armored forces. Briefed to the Central Command’s senior leadership, this assessment helped shape the eventual American ground campaign.

As TF 174 continued its shoestring operations, the rest of the brigade waited for transportation into theater. The need to build up combat power to counter the Iraqi forces meant that intelligence and other support assets were left behind. As it waited, the brigade received a new commander, COL William M. Robeson, on 12 September. Faced with a painfully slow deployment, Robeson traveled to ARCENT headquarters to provide senior on-the-ground leadership and try to push for the deployment of the rest of his brigade.

When Robeson arrived, the 513th MI had just under 200 Soldiers in theater. Although still constrained by limited transportation, he was able to gain approval to bring much of his brigade’s staff to Saudi Arabia in the fall of 1990. The staff was able to make the most of the brigade’s limited assets, establishing limited collection facilities and planning for integrating new equipment—such as the SANDCRAB jamming system—into brigade operations.

By early November the brigade had deployed 500 soldiers—about one-third of its assigned strength—allowing it to enlarge its operations including aerial SIGINT operations and increased CI coverage. Moreover, COL Robeson received permission to call forward the balance of his brigade. At the end of 1990, the brigade’s strength was approaching 90 percent and it received important reinforcements to enhance its theater imagery capabilities.

At the same time, BG John Stewart became the ARCENT G-2 and quickly moved to prepare his staff for more active operations. Not only did he enlarge the staff, he infused it with senior MI leaders from throughout the Army. Both actions benefited the 513th MI Brigade. The experienced leaders supplemented the hard work and enthusiasm of younger Soldiers in the ARCENT Intelligence Center with insight and practical knowledge. Within a few weeks, the brigade almost doubled in size as its battalions finished their deployment and readied themselves to support ARCENT’s offensive.

In January 1991, COL Robeson oversaw the development of key theater intelligence organizations. The 201st MI Battalion coordinated the SIGINT efforts of its ground and aerial assets through the Integrated Ground Operating Facility. Shortly afterwards, the 202d MI Battalion established two joint interrogation facilities and later a document exploitation center. Meanwhile, the 297th MI Battalion provided much of the manning for the Joint Imagery Production Center, which garnered tactical support from theater and national imagery systems. Finally, the FMIB organized the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center for in-theater technical intelligence. Through these operations, the Soldiers of the 513th MI Brigade provided effective multi-discipline intelligence for Army and theater decision makers, greatly assisting the successful ground campaign.

Despite the challenges of a slow deployment to an undeveloped theater, incorporation of almost one thousand augmentees and the integration of new equipment, the 513th MI effectively linked the corps and divisions to intelligence information from the national agencies. It also produced its own intelligence through its various joint facilities and organic collection assets. As BG Stewart noted in his after action report the 513th MI Brigade was “the” key MI capability at the Army level during Operations Desert SHIELD/STORM.

[This article was written by Michael E. Bigelow, Command Historian, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, in February 2016 for the Moments in MI History series.]

History Project

If you are a veteran, contractor, or civilian worker with involvement in US National Security-we need you! The Lint Center for National Security Studies is committed to the preservation of histories of people involved in the shaping and development of US. National Security history as we know it today. The experiences of veterans, contractors, and civil service members involved in US N.S. are needed to not only to help us better understand our own history but to carry that knowledge forward for future generations.

If you would like to add your experiences to the archive, please Submit Your Story!

*If you are interested in conducting an Oral History interview, or have any questions about the program, please contact our historian at LC-VANS-Hist1@lintcenter.org.

Lou Rothenstein, CSM RET
Reflections from 1956-86 of Security During My Army Career and Afterlife

Reflections Over the Years of Security During My Military Career and Afterlife.

By Lou Rothenstein, CSM RET & Former Military Intelligence  Corps SGM

The reflections from Lou Rothenstein give great insight to Army Intelligence during the Cold War from 1956-86, through the eyes of an infantryman turned MI soldier. He has been in some interesting units. JRL

Through my military career and afterlife, I occasionally found that organizations and activities put most of their efforts into things that are easy and safe.  For the police, it is generally easy and safe to pick up a pothead and his girlfriend after they buy some pot.  On the other hand, it is difficult and dangerous to do surveillance and then make arrests in the middle of a large-scale drug transaction, particularly in Chicago.  I think that in security, this can also be the case.

Back in those earlier days, we had to rely on the MP Corps for some physical security guys to do surveys.  The problem was that there were very few of them. Of course our CI folks would come in to check for bugs, do the required interviews and some of us would check document security.  It could often take a long time to get these basic security measures completed.  So many were simply never finished. It became apparent that some units and officials did not want to be embarrassed with a poor survey or perhaps hearing their voices picked up by technical means discussing classified matters in an area not cleared for anything above rumor.  Vending machines were rare back then at military headquarters, but janitorial service was not. It was also difficult to get someone who wielded a mop a clearance, so we usually did the cleaning ourselves in classified areas.

I thought it ironic that often SECRET NOFORN (except UK) could be shared with the Brix but not the French.  I know there were some treaties and we did not have that close security relationship with them over things like TOPAZ.  What I often found was that the French would have the same SECRET-NF report as NATO CONFIDENTIAL.  I also discovered that we always put some sources and methods into SCI whereas many other countries reserve that for higher level things, not tactical. Using foreign reports made it easier to disseminate information to the field.  If we would have had that dual kind of setup in Vietnam, I believe the war would have gone a bit better and perhaps saved some lives.

When I was in a cast in 1962, I was assigned to OCINC at USAREUR HQ.  Down in the basement, I had the vault for messages.   11 of the standard issue 4 drawer Moslers, each one a different classification or access.  Some of the exotic names I would wager that few people ever heard of. The most difficult part of this short-lived job was remembering combinations and when items were returned, checking in detail who had access to them.

I not only had access to the intelligence side of a potential war, but also the operational side to include special weapons items.  I never carried anything in or out of that dungeon-like office.  A voice told me it was not a good idea. After having a few messages delivered to me that I should not have received, then signing a couple of letters that advised me of severe fines and possible incarceration if I so much as looked at them, I was convinced that, as soon as I could, I would request a transfer back to a tactical field unit.  

On a later job at G2 USAREUR & 7A, we had a couple of teletypes spouting out AP, Reuters, and the best, The Christian Science Monitor (they had real sources in unusual places).  The unclassified story or info often was a near carbon copy of something we had marked SECRET NOFORN.  But of course, I could not use the unclassified item to send down to troops units, and the powers that be were unwilling to request declassification of the items easily found in the press.  Seems that when something is once stamped, no one downgrades it but leaves it for someone else to shoulder the responsibility. Since that time, I have tried to tell junior analysts that OSINT is an important part of their job. Over the years, I have seen a tendency to rate intelligence information more by the classification or compartment rather than the content.

In that same job, I noted several career US civilian GS-00 types that had access to everything.  They attended briefings that were no longer related to their day-to-day work having moved up the ladder, they were in one area of specialization.  When I inquired about this, a field grade officer advised me that we couldn’t take away their special accesses as it would be seen as “punishment.” I could live with that except there were often a limit on billets and pick and shovel analysts had to get updates by word of mouth. I had a bit of experience following a few of our cold war era turncoats.  Fortunately, only one had knowledge of anything that might help the other side long term.  All of them were in some form of economic crisis and had relationship problems as well.  After a few years, a couple got in trouble in their new homeland and one got kicked out.  Although there was information available in their units, none of it was reported to investigative elements.

In the late 1960’s in Heidelberg, I worked in G2.  One evening in government quarters I received a call from a medic I knew who was assigned to the hospital.  He asked me to stop by and look in on a seriously injured USAF Major who was muttering some foreign language.  I went in and I immediately recognized Russian from my days in Berlin.  I called the local CI field office and they came in and placed someone on guard there.

Later I heard (I never confirmed this) that this Major was not who his records indicated but a sleeper.  He had orders to report to NORAD HQ.  The value of a good unit SAEDA/TARP program has been with me ever since then.

Thinking back on my years in AIS/MI, I do not believe I ever saw anything declassified or “automatically downgraded” until I was at Sergeant Major with G2, 25th Infantry Division in 1976-77.  All the message traffic around the Pearl Harbor attack was declassified.  They clearly depicted the numerous intelligence and operations mistakes that were made in judgement, communications, and information dissemination from November 1941 to the attack on 7 December.  I posted them on the bulletin board for all to read.  Even with the downgrading instructions clearly on the messages, some questioned whether they should be on a board for all to see.  25 years after the attack that seemed a bit too long.  The messages were a good training aid to point out the importance of reporting everything out of the norm by all to appropriate parties or units.

The story of perhaps the greatest spy ever, Pham Xuan An who worked for the US media in Saigon from the very early days of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, had access to most briefings from MACV HQ that were distributed to the press by PAO (who always provided answers to the press).  They were hand carried by chiefs of the various news media from the MACV daily briefing to their offices and simply put on a clipboard for reporters to read.  Of course Mister An, (The spy who loved us), also had access to them.  One could spend hours on the numbers of operations that were compromised by him.  All intelligence and security personnel should read the book about him. This story is close to me as during a couple of TDY trips to Vietnam, I was billeted at a hotel where the press lived, and partied. I was able to provide some information to the intelligence side of life there on some of the people at the hotel.  It resulted in my assignment to intel duties, and I probably had a drink or two with Mister An.   

Every time I see a picture of a document safe or think about security, a recurring memory pops up on my screen. Around New Year’s 72-73 I was assigned as a First Sergeant at the US Army Intelligence Center & School at Fort Huachuca.  I had quite a few soldiers in work areas spread around the old post WWII era hospital.  Doing my rounds of the rapidly deteriorating wooden buildings, I often unchecked fire extinguishers, doors and windows inoperative or lying on the ground, and steps that were unsafe.  I was jotting down problems that were in need of repair when I entered an unused wing that on prior inspections was simply just looked at.  I noticed a door at one end.  I opened it, went into the windowless room and lo and behold, before my eyes stood seven gray 1100 pound Moslers in this unlocked building.  There wasn’t much identifying data on them but one had the old OPEN/CLOSED sign at the top drawer handle.  It said open.  I just had to try it.  Of course it was unlocked.  I opened it and found that it was full of classified material.  

The safes were shipped from Fort Holabird, MD probably a year prior, unloaded at their present location and forgotten.  My heart was actually racing as I leafed through some of this really interesting material.  

I could not immediately make a decision to lock it or leave it open while I went to a phone to report it.  I checked the other safes but only one other was open.  It contained a lot of lesson plans mostly unclassified.  

As I was leaving, I picked what looked like a good sample document of what was in the safe marked SECRET, put it on my clipboard under my inspection sheet, locked the safe and was leaving when the floor caved in on me.  I hit a spot of rotten wood.  Somewhat scratched and bruised I went to the School HQ and provided a Colonel a brief summary of my discovery and he asked what happened to me. The dry rotted floor was explained to him.  I gave him the document and he then slapped his forehead, muttering something.  What I could surmise is that there was some knowledge of missing documents from the intel school move that was being investigated but the full listing of missing documents could not be determined as registers were also missing. The Colonel asked me to write a brief note on it and to not discuss it with anyone outside of the HQ.  I didn’t.  

Some years later when I was attending an INSCOM/USAICS conference at Fort Huachuca, I attended a briefing by the commandant, a two-star who at one time was assigned to my company as a LTC.  He mentioned how things can go awry and he mentioned the incident.  I had to tell him it was I who found the safes.   I never witnessed General Weinstein laugh so much. Between guffaws, he stated he now had the responsible party and I would be justly punished.  I got a coin. 

On an assignment in Korea, I was designated as a part-time inspector with the KORSCOM, later Eighth Army IG team.  Mostly company training and administration but also arms room, document and personnel security along with the PRP.  From prior tutelage from an old CI hand, I always checked desk calendars for safe combinations.  I found a couple.  I opened my favorite, the 1100 pound Mosler, removed a document to show the IG.  It had an unsigned receipt that was never sent to the sender.  It was a document that was mailed from Japan to Korea some months back and was being searched for.  The officer had no cleared enlisted personnel in his area.  It was a field office for a unit physically located in a different geographical area.  I provided some instruction on document security to the enlisted technicians in the unit.  This same type of physical setup of field offices from different commands revealed other violations.  It was a good policy for Eighth Army to provide inspection services on a geographical rather than command lines that plugged oversight violations like this from becoming serious.

I cannot address the area of cyber security much as I was watching the internet being born about the time I retired.  This was the time when nearly every senior person – whether officer, NCO or civilian – in areas that were suddenly blessed with ruggedized Apple II computers needed a bright young soldier around to insure things would get done correctly and to teach us how not to be embarrassed.   Some of us actually learned how to make up a few macros from these young software developing soldiers.

I do know that cyber security is a serious matter.  I also know that the only personal information compromise on me occurred through two USG agencies.  Apparently there was little emphasis in this area as the low bids and least secure systems were contracted.  I hope that this is being corrected but somehow I have doubts.  Being a doubting Thomas is a good approach to working around security.  What can go wrong often goes wrong unless the boss checks things fairly often and well.

Background about the Author:    Lou Rothenstein, CSM RET & Former MI Corps SGM

30 years AD 1956-86, 4 years Honorary SGM of MI Corps working with USAR/NG MI units activated during Desert Shield/Storm.  Recruited into AIS after Infantry, injury/admin.

Started in AIS when the army converted some infantry/recon positions to AIS in 1962/63.  Working with several GO along the way I got to see things a bit different than some other guys.

As primarily a 96B Analyst, I was often in jobs that were short 97’s, II’s, and learned to do some of this stuff – correspondence courses, questioning old hands, etc.  I never went to an MI school.  OJT.  Only at the school as a 1SG at Fort Huachca.  I also learned while there from old hands.  

As an example, I learned accountability/fund handling from the US Navy.  Taught it once a month in Vietnam to those going to Phoenix.  I think a really rewarding area was trying to take care of MOS 97’s on special assignments.  Many were overlooked for promotion boards and we were able to get them caught up by placing in a job for a short time for experience or convincing the board that they did good things.   Another was the integration of ASA and MI.

I was fortunate to have had outstanding MI officers as bosses.  Many of these early officers took over billets that were previously combat arms and convinced commanders that they could be of valuable service in their missions.  I was most fortunate to end up at US Army CECOM as I was asked for my field experience on several projects.

Would have gone to to the higher HQ, AMC but could hardly walk, so I quit.

Lou Rothenstein, CSM RET 

History Project

If you are a veteran, contractor, or civilian worker with involvement in US National Security-we need you! The Lint Center for National Security Studies is committed to the preservation of histories of people involved in the shaping and development of US. National Security history as we know it today. The experiences of veterans, contractors, and civil service members involved in US N.S. are needed to not only to help us better understand our own history but to carry that knowledge forward for future generations.

If you would like to add your experiences to the archive, please Submit Your Story!

 

*If you are interested in conducting an Oral History interview, or have any questions about the program, please contact our historian at LC-VANS-Hist1@lintcenter.org.

Operation DESERT OWL Provides Linguists for First Gulf War

By USAICoE Command History Office, (Published with permission.)
[This is an updated and expanded version of an article previously published in the Fort Huachuca Scout in January 2013.]

With the outbreak of the first Gulf War, the US Army realized it had a shortage of Soldiers proficient in Arabic. The US Army’s 267 Arabic linguists, trained in Syrian, Egyptian, and other Persian Gulf dialects, had already deployed to Saudi Arabia in late 1990 to serve with the XVIII Airborne Corps. When the Army committed a second corps to the conflict, it faced an additional requirement for more than 900 linguists. The 142nd MI Battalion (Utah National Guard) deployed its Arabic speakers as reinforcements, but the need for more linguists could not be satisfied, even partially, until the middle of the following year.

To help mitigate the shortage, Col. William Lipke, from the office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, dealt directly with the government of Kuwait to establish Operation DESERT OWL. The Kuwaiti Embassy in Washington, DC, recruited volunteers from Kuwaiti college students already in the US to provide language support for the military efforts in the Persian Gulf. The 300 students chosen spoke fluent English, as well as the Iraqi dialect of Arabic. Their understanding of American customs and traditions eased their adjustment to serving side-by-side with American Soldiers.

The DESERT OWL volunteers enlisted as sergeants in the Kuwaiti Army and then reported to Fort Dix, New Jersey, for training and equipping on January 6, 1991. The span of time between identification of the requirement and the arrival of the students at Fort Dix was approximately six weeks.

The US Army Intelligence School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts (USAISD), served as executive agent for DESERT OWL. The Electronic Warfare Department quickly developed a training package to ensure these native speakers could provide language support to tactical intelligence and electronic warfare ground system teams in Saudi Arabia. On January 4, USAISD’s 40-person Training Task Force (TTF), directed by Lt. Col. Donald Manchester, traveled to Fort Dix to prepare to provide the accelerated intelligence training. The Combat Intelligence Training Course (CITC) began on January 7.

The CITC focused foremost on teaching the Kuwaitis to recognize enemy communications and to extract essential information for intelligence purposes. The students learned military terminology, the structure of military communications, US and Iraqi order of battle, and the recognition of Iraqi military communications. Students also learned the basics of the US Army’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment in use at that time.
The CITC also incorporated combat skills, such as basic rifle marksmanship, M-16 familiarization, nuclear/biological/chemical training, and gas mask confidence. These skills were taught by drill instructors from Fort Dix’s 3/26th Infantry Battalion as well as drill sergeants and non-commissioned officers from Fort Deven’s 306th MI Battalion and NCO Academy.

Although all the students were expected to arrive at once, they actually arrived in four groups over the course of the week. Because they had a fixed deployment date, the training for the later arrivals had to be curtailed to fit the time available. On January 14, just eight days after their arrival at Fort Dix, 287 graduates of the CITC to Saudi Arabia.

On January 15, the TTF returned to Fort Devens. Less than a week later, it received a new task to train an additional 40 Kuwaiti soldiers. By the time this class started on January 27, an addition 20 trainees had been identified specifically for the interrogation mission. While the SIGINT students worked with Devens instructors, the interrogators trained with a two-person MTT sent from the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The 59 graduates of the late January course deployed from on February 6. A final class of 63 Kuwaitis trained in interrogation skills from February 20-26 at Fort Dix. The Fort Huachuca MTT also conducted this accelerated course, artfully condensing a 9-week program of instruction into just 28 hours.

M915 tractor with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers waiting for the convoy to move out.

Eventful Convoy in Desert Storm

Boring convoys would be nice, but can get over exciting quickly. (Where is the ammo truck?)
During the convoy, at about 2am, on this super highway in the middle of the Saudi wasteland, there’s nothing but pitch blackness except for the dim illumination of our trucks headlights and the occasional passing motorist. Our vehicle intervals are stretched out to about 100 meters and we can barely make out who is ahead of us or who is behind us, except again, for the faint illumination of the lights of the trucks and our convoy manifest. We are tired and sleepy, having been driving for 20 hours or so.

Navy Cryptology
The Evolution of Navy Cryptology

BY U.S. NAVY – MARCH 11, 2016
POSTED IN: INFORMATION WARFARE, INSIDE THE NAVY
By Vice Adm. Jan E. Tighe
Commander, Fleet Cyber Command, U.S. 10th Fleet

Eighty-one years ago today, the first unified organization coordinating Navy Cryptology, the Communications Security Group, was established. From Station HYPO, OP-20-G and the On the Roof Gang, to the present day, our community has continued to evolve to meet and defeat the threats we face.

The transition of the Information Dominance Corps to the Information Warfare Community in concert with the CNO’s Design for Maritime Superiority has given us another opportunity to formalize our evolution, and to deliberately examine our community identity. A great deal of our heritage can be traced to the Naval Security Group, and our collective identification as Navy cryptologists.

To that end, and based on thoughtful input from the affected members of our community, the name of some of our officer designators (181X, 681X, 781X) will be changing to cryptologic warfare officer. This choice honors our cryptologic heritage, reflects what we do, recognizes the military effects we deliver in the converged domain and more closely ties our officer corps with our enlisted and civilian force counterparts. Cryptologic warfare officers, together with cyber warfare engineers, cyber warrant officers, cryptologic technicians (interpretive, maintenance, networks, collection and technical) and civilians, engaged in cryptologic missions are a unified community—unified through understanding, unified in action and unified by name.

We are Navy cryptologists.

Whether we are executing mission under joint commanders, fleet commanders, Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA), or the Commander, United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM); and whether significant portions of our missions are organized under Communications Security Group, Naval Security Group, Naval Network Warfare Command or today’s Fleet Cyber Command/10th Fleet, we have our own enduring identity, culture and ethos.

We are the Navy cryptologic community.

On behalf of maritime and joint commanders, we execute cryptologic warfare, which encompasses signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyberspace operations and electronic warfare (EW) operations in order to deliver effects through sea, air, land, space and cyber domains at all levels of war.

As a symbol of what we do, I would also like to share with you our new Navy cryptologic community seal. While not a representative of a Navy organization or command in the traditional sense, this seal represents our own rich heritage, who we are and where we are going. It represents us.

The Naval officer crest and our cryptologic technician insignia, with its lightning bolt and quill, represent and respect our long history. These symbols have stood from the earliest days of our community to the present day.

The binary background overlaid on the globe represents our part in the larger information warfare community, whose seal shares the same symbolism, as well as our core expertise in cyber, along with our global reach.

The skeleton key reminds us that we are relied upon to unlock and solve puzzles, and in many cases find missing pieces to paint a complete picture of our Nation’s adversaries. The key is engraved with the date symbolic of our collective establishment as a naval profession: March 11, 1935.

The chain binds us all together — officer, enlisted, and civilian — and binds our core missions — SIGINT, Cyber, and EW — to us, and us to them. The three stars also symbolize these three core missions. Through the converged domain, we enable and deliver effects to the commander and fellow warfighters. Our Community Vision, an update to our 2012 Foundational Principles, is also under construction and I will share it with you as soon as it is complete.

Please join me in embracing this next evolution of our community, which has stood on the shoulders of giants, both seen and unseen. Today, you who serve in the Navy cryptologic community will be those giants upon whom future generations of Navy cryptologists stand.

The Future of Cryptology | The Lint Center for National Security Studies

The Future of Cryptology

Is there anything as futile to write about as the future? We are certainly guaranteed to never reach it. When we attempt to predict the future, history proves that we will mostly be wrong about the outcome. So, why talk about the future?

I believe the answer is because thinking about the future drives our actions in the present. The future is where we set our goals, which then drive our passions, which should drive our labors. There is a responsibility inherent in speaking about the future.
Being a good futurist means a few of your predictions must come true at some point. The conclusions a futurist makes should be grounded in fact, feasible in the long term, and have a course by which to get there.
So, a futurist must study history, specifically, the history of how ideas become inventions, inventions become innovations, and innovations, through entrepreneurship, become the new normal.

A futurist must also study the present. They need to be aware of the challenges of the present day because that will drive the decisions that will shape the future. A futurist however looks at the present and thinks, “what must change to make the future happen.” As a result, the futurist tends to uncover dirty secrets that stand in the way of change.

Many of these secrets are buried under the phrase, “We have always done it this way.” For many, that is the place to stop. For the futurist, that is the first sign you are on the right track. It is also the inherent danger in looking to the future.

My part in the Station HYPO blog is to discuss the future of the Cryptologic Community. I believe I have it easier in some ways than the others because I only have to be right on occasion. Those writing on the past and present of the community’s comments are inherently testable. My comments only need to be plausible at some point in the future.

Is some ways, I have a more serious charge. I will be talking about the future and to do so I will talk about change. I will respect the past, but not be beholden to it. I will always live in the challenges of the present, but I have to remain optimistic enough that I can see through the challenges of the day to the opportunities that may be. I must boldly go forward speaking of what I believe is the best course for the community to steer knowing I may never see the final destination.

I hope to bring some direction to our community’s collective labors and share the passion I have for it. I will be looking for others to share their vision for the future. Hopefully they will choose to share their stories here. Email me here at the blog if you are interested.

In the next few months, I will be writing on what I believe the some of the trends are for the future of the Cryptologic Community. I will spend a moment here to mention the future of the Cryptologic Community includes our Cyber friends. It is easier to see the connection in the enlisted community with the Cryptologic Technician Networks (CTN) community. On the officer and civilian sides, it is more difficult to define the boundaries. At the very least, our Cryptologic Community includes past, present and future; active, inactive, reserve, and retired; radiomen conducting cryptologic operations; cryptologists; cryptologic technicians; information warfare officers, warrant officers and LDOs; cyber warfare engineers and warrants; and civilians conducting similar functions.

Because of this fine group, the future of the Cryptologic Community is bright. Welcome to Station HYPO.

-Jason

Republished with permission from Station HYPO

http://www.stationhypo.com/2015/10/the-future-of-cryptology.html