Cyber Intelligence War 2000 to Present
Starting from Titan Rain to present Nation State Actors conducting Cyber Espionage
One of the best articles about Titan Rain was from Time Magazine.
The lesson of Titan Rain: Articulate the dangers of cyber attack to upper management. article by Homeland Security News Wire.
(2003). Intelligence in Support of Strategic Signal Units – starts page 40 by James R. Lint
Please send your information, story or pictures for this time in history. http://lc-vans.lintcenter.org/submit-your-story/
Titan Rain: Chinese Cyberespionage? – TIME Inside the Chinese Hack Attack 25 Aug 2005
The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies – TIME 29 Aug 2005
by Richard Laszok
Printed with Permission
As an Infantry Officer in the Marine Corps, I spent the majority of my time training with or advising partnered forces. Through my career, I participated in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises across the Asia-Pacific region and served as an adviser in Afghanistan. Aside from the cultural differences, the partnered forces in the TSC exercises I participated in had varying capabilities and proficiencies. This required my team to develop different approaches to how we would maximize training opportunities for everyone. As a member of Task Force Southwest, an adviser team deliberately built to provide training, advising, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) in Helmand province had to apply similar skills. All these experiences have taught me several lessons, but have identified what I consider the top three which contributed to the success of my teams.
1) Know your stuff. It seems intuitive enough, but before you can teach or advise, you must master the material yourself. It requires competency in the subjects you will be advising. The amount of time you dedicate to learning and reviewing your subject will directly relate to your effectiveness as an adviser or partner. Competency provides accurate information taught or shared and provides a level of confidence that helps deliver the information. I attribute the success of my teams during the TSC exercises and advising efforts to the preparation. Preparation also includes knowing a little about your partner. Take the time to learn about their culture, customs, and if possible a few simple phrases. Knowing some of these little things will make what you teach more meaningful and leave a positive lasting effect.
2) They aren’t us. It’s okay that they are different and sometimes that makes the partnership more valuable. Leverage the differences to bring new ideas and approaches to problem solving. Often we tend to think that our way is the best way to solve the problem but when working with different cultures the host nation personnel may provide the best solution with a little assistance from you. They bring an understanding that a foreigner might not understand or overlook. For example, initially, when we were advising the Afghan instructors at the 215th Corps Regional Military Training Center we wanted the instructors to follow written outlines for the courses. This is how our militaries do business, why shouldn’t they. Well, we quickly found out that the majority of the instructors were illiterate. Having detailed written classes would not have helped because they couldn’t read the material. Our solution was to develop the instructors in the skills they were good at already and help them professionalize their ability to instruct. If you are there solely as an adviser, always encourage the host nation personnel to develop their own solutions but be willing to assist along the way. There were many occasions as an adviser where it would have been faster or easier for my team or me to provide the solution upfront. We had to resist the urge to do this and allow the host nation personnel to work through the issues. At the end of the day as long as progress was made and solutions were developed that was effective advising. Efficiency became the next goal.
3) Be self-aware. You and the team need to have self-awareness. Effective advising means the host nation is demonstrating improvements. If they aren’t improving, you aren’t being effective. You might be the most knowledgeable subject matter expert or best instructor back home, but if the target audience doesn’t get it your wasting everyone’s time. This requires the adviser(s) to have the maturity to reflect to improve or sustain their approach to advising. Constant assessments of yourself and your partner will help shape and drive your engagement strategy.
Advising skills will continue to be relevant to the U.S. military and success of future missions. Understanding these skills will enhance partnerships during TSC exercises, which are valuable for building partnered capacity throughout the world. Maintaining these strong relationships will be imperative if the countries have to work together in response to a humanitarian disaster or execute combat operations. Finally, these lessons are also good leadership tools that can be applied to our own military services. Leaders can use them to develop their subordinates and ultimately strengthen our own warfighting organizations.
Published with Permission by:
Irajpanah, Katherine, “Dismantling North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program Starts with Understanding Its History”, In Homeland Security, 04 July 2018, Web, https://inhomelandsecurity.com/nuclear-weapons-program-history/
By Katherine Irajpanah
Writer, Lint Center for National Security Studies, Inc., and Special Contributor, In Homeland Security
On June 12, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea met in Singapore for a historic summit. During the meeting, the United States and North Korea established the diplomatic foundation for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Singapore summit followed a year of intensified vitriol between the two countries and decades of unsuccessful attempts at halting North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons.
The summit and forthcoming diplomatic talks highlight the need to understand the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The program, which has developed over the course of approximately six decades, has perplexed the past several presidential administrations. That suggests that the United States must approach the negotiating table cautiously and be prepared for lengthy, technical discussions.
The Beginnings of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program dates to the 1950s in the aftermath of the Korean War. The war, which pitted South Korea and the United States against North Korea and China, created a great sense of insecurity in the regime of the DPRK’s founder, Kim Il-sung.
DPRK nuclear ambitions largely grew from those insecurities. Weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, presented the Kim regime with a potential guarantor of its security as well as a means of deterring the United States from invading North Korea.
Although North Korea’s nuclear program has largely been indigenous, Pyongyang received external technical assistance during its early years. In the 1960s, for example, the Soviet Union helped the North Koreans develop early nuclear reactors, which can provide a source of fissionable material to make a hydrogen bomb. Moreover, in the 1970s, North Korea modeled its short-range missiles on Soviet Scud missiles it had acquired from Egypt.
By the 1980s, North Korea had developed its own nuclear research institutions, uranium mining facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex and a five-megawatt nuclear reactor. After signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, Kim secured further Soviet assistance to develop light water reactors (LWRs). With these facilities and other projects in place, Kim Il-sung successfully developed a nuclear bomb option and the foundation of North Korea’s current nuclear weapons program.
The Rise and Fall of Diplomatic Agreements
North Korea’s nuclear threat reached a flashpoint in 1994, when the United States and North Korea faced the risk of war as a result of the North’s provocations. After the 1994 crisis abated, Washington and Pyongyang held diplomatic talks that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework.
In that agreement, the United States promised security assurances and proliferation-resistant LWRs to North Korea. Also, North Korea promised to freeze and dismantle its nuclear reactors and submit to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Both parties, however, failed to live up to the agreement. As a result, the Agreed Framework fell apart.
North Korea Gradually Builds Nuclear Bomb Program
By late 2003, under Kim’s son, Kim Jong-Il, North Korea likely had acquired a nuclear bomb. To stem the North’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, the United States convened a new diplomatic channel, the Six-Party Talks. That channel involved North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia and China.
In 2005, the North Koreans announced that they would abandon their nuclear program. Nonetheless, North Korea reneged on its statement and conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 2006. In April 2009, after much back-and-forth communication over proposed arrangements, North Korea withdrew from the Six-Party talks.
Kim Jong-un and the DPRK Nuclear Program
In 2011, Kim Jong-un succeeded his late father, Kim Jong-Il, as “Supreme Leader” and accelerated the nuclear weapons program. To the young leader’s way of thinking, nuclear weapons would ensure the regime’s security and afford him a level of international prestige.
Under Kim Jong-un, North Korea conducted four new nuclear tests. On September 3, 2017, the official North Korean news agency, KCNA, reported the successful testing of a hydrogen bomb.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, North Korea now has an estimated 15 to 20 nuclear weapons, “while U.S. intelligence believes the number to be between thirty and sixty bombs.” Experts also believe that Kim has a functioning intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Some reports suggest that North Korea has the capability to miniaturize its nuclear weapons and mount them on an ICBM, the final element needed to bring about a nuclear holocaust.
International Community’s Response to North Korea’s Behavior
The international community has responded to North Korea’s behavior with intensified economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Even China, which has always served as a key economic and political ally of North Korea across the decades, has joined the international efforts to use sanctions to bring Kim to the negotiating table.
As a probable consequence of the mounting economic pressure of these sanctions and the rogue nation’s increasing international isolation, Kim Jong-un has turned away from bombastic rhetoric to diplomatic overtures. At the recent Singapore summit, Kim affirmed “his firm and unwavering commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Beyond the Singapore Summit
The history of North Korea’s nuclear program suggests that the diplomats involved in the forthcoming negotiations must now proceed deliberately and in a clear-eyed manner. To work toward the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear arsenal, the United States will need to consider some form of security reassurance for the Kim regime.
Furthermore, many details about North Korea’s nuclear program remain unknown, and North Korea has reneged on agreements in the past. Any agreement with North Korea will need to emphasize intrusive, on-the-ground verification to both monitor its progress on denuclearization and close the information gap on DPRK nuclear assets.
Finally, the world at large must understand that, as nuclear expert Siegfried S. Hecker estimated, DPRK disarmament could take over a decade to complete due to the technical demands of dismantling its nuclear complex.
Overall, the best path forward in addressing the North Korean nuclear threat is one that emphasizes diplomacy and recognizes the historical challenges associated with Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
About the Author
Katherine Irajpanah is an intern and writer at the Lint Center for National Security Studies. She is currently studying for her bachelor’s degree in international relations at Stanford University and works as a research assistant at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
Published with Permission by:
Lint, James R., “North Korea’s June 25 Surprise Attack: An Important Lesson in Battle Preparation”, In Homeland Security, 23 June 2016, Web, https://inhomelandsecurity.com/north-koreas-june-25-surprise-attack-important-lesson-battle-preparation/
By James Lint
Faculty Member, American Public University System
June 25 is a day that all military planners and intelligence professionals should remember as a lesson in proper battle preparation. On that date in 1950, North Korea surprised the U.S. military with an attack that swept U.S. and South Korean forces into the Pusan Perimeter and almost off the Korean peninsula. Defeat appeared quick and sudden.
It was only nine years after the devastation at Pearl Harbor and no one believed that a surprise attack could happen to U.S. forces ever again. But it did.
For the United States, intelligence focus on a former small Japanese-occupied territory was a low priority. The mistake was missing the buildup of Communist support and the large amount of combat equipment in North Korea compared to South Korea, obvious indicators of battle preparation that we can see in hindsight. Because the U.S. overlooked these signs of impending combat, North Korea’s invasion led to a long, bloody civil war.
How Did This Surprise Attack Happen?
There are several reasons why North Korea’s invasion came as a surprise to the U.S. military:
- The U.S. was a budding world power and had many places to focus. For example, there were Cold War activities in Europe and Africa. The U.S. had a small intelligence force, with the CIA’s founding in September 1947. By 1950, the CIA was still prioritizing areas to watch and spend assets.
- The U.S. had won World War II, creating a sense of false confidence that no country would have the audacity to attack the U.S. America was the strong victor who had beaten the Germans, Italians and Japanese. But the U.S. did not take into account that other countries saw the massive drawdown and shrinkage of our active military after WWII.
- Military and government leaders did not rigorously review intelligence collection management or intelligence collection requirements. The Army was otherwise occupied with disarming former WWII foes. Korea ended the war as occupied Japanese territory and later broke up into North and South Korea. Russia gained influence in North Korea after this division.
- U.S. military and civilian intelligence services were unprepared for an imminent battle. There was a prevailing sense among intelligence leaders that “a new battle cannot happen,” which proved to be wrong. Even during peacetime, it is wise to be aware of potential combat possibilities and probabilities.
Insufficient Military Forces and Logistics Failure Contributed to US Failure to Anticipate Invasion
Military planners should remember that the military manning the Korean peninsula was insufficient to quickly deploy and logistics had degraded. The 1st Marine Division was not fully prepared to deploy from California and newly recruited Marines had to do their training on the ships that conveyed them to the battlefield. Also, combat personnel had inappropriate footwear for the climate; there were stories of people with dress shoes in wintertime combat.
History shows that most drawdowns go too far. Often, enemies see the possibility for them to advance due to a recent drawdown, especially during the early period of a new war.
Constant Vigilance Against Enemies is Always Vital
This invasion was also an important lesson to intelligence professionals, especially in the military. They must always be energetic and alert for the next December 7 or June 25. Being in the military is not an easy profession. No one hears about the minor successes, but everyone knows mistakes can be costly.
South Korean Post-War Economy Recovers with US Support
U.S. troops have been in Korea since 1945, when they accepted the surrender of Japanese troops at the end of WWII. Many people wonder if remaining in Korea is worth it.
Seoul is a noteworthy story of economic recovery and success after a devastating war. It is an economic power and a member of a vibrant, international business community. The American military assisted in that growth by providing military protection and support. Early on, U.S. support fed a starving population in South Korea. Later, the U.S. helped South Korea to create a strong military for defending the country.
American military support, the Peace Corps and foreign aid all built Korea into a strong country that is now a world-recognized economic power. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks South Korea as the 11th most powerful economy in the world.
The United States took over 200 years to get to our strong economic position. Korea did it in 60 years, going from abject poverty to economic strength with U.S. support.
Strategic Lessons to Be Learned From Korean War
We rarely talk about North Korea’s surprise attack at the start of the Korean War. But it is important to remember our failures and avoid repeating our mistakes. We should remember, that in an attack, the enemy has a vote in the outcome of a battle. Adequate battle preparation can be a decisive factor in combat and can defeat unexpected invasions.
About the Author
James Lint recently retired as the (GG-15) civilian director for intelligence and security, G2, U.S. Army Communications Electronics Command. He is an adjunct professor at AMU. Additionally, James started the Lint Center for National Security Studies, a nonprofit charity that recently awarded the 40th scholarship for national security students and professionals. He has 38 years of experience in military intelligence within the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, contractor, and civil service. James was also elected as the 2015 national vice president for the Military Intelligence Corps Association. He has served in the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis and at the Department of Energy’s S&S Security Office. James had an active military career in the Marine Corps for seven years and also served 14 years in the Army. His military assignments include South Korea, Germany and Cuba in addition to numerous CONUS locations. James has authored a book published in 2013, “Leadership and Management Lessons Learned,” and a new book “8 Eyes on Korea, A Travel Perspective of Seoul, Korea.”